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ADRIANA N. SEAGLE

Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School Perspective

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The evolution of intelligence sharing within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reveals periods of tension, relaxation, and intense cooperation. Historically, the relationship among the United States, France, and the United Kingdom regarding intelligence sharing, especially during the Cold War, has not been one of trust and mutual cooperation. The mistrust of NATO's allies in the American deterrent strategy related not to Washington's willingness to keep its commitment to defend Europeans, but rather to the idea that in an event involving nuclear weapons "an American politician would never exchange the survival of Detroit for that of Paris."[1] This psychological insecurity prompted President Charles de Gaulle, in 1966, to withdraw French forces from NATO and demand that its headquarters be moved from Paris to Brussels, Belgium. France's reaction was based on the U.S.'s refusal to share control over technological intelligence and nuclear weapons, as well as the fact that during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis "America's allies from Western

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Europe were being *informed* rather than *consulted*" as required by the NATO treaty's Article 5.[2]

During the Cold War, Western Europe's concern over methods of collecting intelligence prompted the development of new technological capabilities, resulting by the 1980s, in a substantial improvement in the use of satellites.[3] The flow of intelligence has been much smoother between the U.S. and the UK, especially in signals intelligence (SIGINT). But outside of SIGINT, sharing was selective, involving simple exchanges of papers and U.S. participation in the drafting process of the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).[4] In the contemporary period, trust among allies continues to remain a concern. The news media, for instance, have speculated that German's Lt. Gen. Klaus Schuwirth became the European Union's (EU's) Director of Military Staff in Brussels because of the American reluctance to share high-grade signals intelligence with the French.[5] In the Cold War period, the relationship between Paris and London was marked by mistrust as de Gaulle consistently viewed Britain as an American asset in NATO.[6] Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September (9/11) 2001, NATO's intelligence services have been criticized for their lack of coordination and inability to connect the intelligence dots on the Islamist hijackers.[7] U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, for instance, recommended that NATO develop better intelligence coordination to address strategic issues before they become military ones:

> NATO would do a better job of seeing that the intelligence capabilities of the respective countries are brought together and that the people in NATO and the capitals of NATO countries are kept tuned into those threats and the kinds of capabilities that we as free people face. We're much more likely to get a faster common understanding to the extent we have a reasonably similar perspective with respect to what the facts are.[8]

Notably, intelligence sharing within NATO is affected not only by matters of trust and coordination but also by the merit of classification despite the fact that NATO promotes common security clearances and common practices for handling intelligence documents. Belgium, for example, exchanges intelligence information within the Belgian State Security (VSSE) network without classification.[9] This facilitates faster information exchange, eliminates the effect of information abundance, and enhances efficiency and productivity. NATO's Nordic countries (Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Norway) find intelligence cooperation with non-NATO members, Finland and Sweden, "natural and a question of geography, culture, and values." As one official put it, "We speak the same language. We feel closer to each other than most other people [...] There is already a very good

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cooperation between intelligence services in the Nordic countries. It was like this even in the Cold War. There are close contacts at a personal level. It's an issue of trust, of joint interests."[10] This illustrates a fructuous, tacit regional intelligence sharing inside and outside NATO despite the fact that Finland and Sweden are not NATO members. The official added, "Do you believe that if there is an attack on one of the Nordic countries, it is possible to isolate that country? No. If one Nordic country is attacked, it may happen that all the others are also involved."[11] As suggested, a common understanding of identity, culture, geography, and values enhances the regional intelligence sharing practice among the Nordic countries.

EVOLUTION OF NATO INTELLIGENCE

During the Cold War, intelligence sharing in NATO was strategic in nature and focused intensively on political and military factors including, sporadically, the economic sector. In the contemporary period, the domain of intelligence has shifted to include discussions of terrorism, technology, cultural and economic analysis, as well as the environment. For states, intelligence sharing, post-9/11, has become a demonstration of solidarity to prevent or combat common threats as well as a means of competition. Perceived by some as a diplomatic tool of efficiency for "better and faster information," and by others as a form of power to achieve a specific purpose within the organization, intelligence gathering and sharing in the post-Cold War era evolved beyond the level of deterrence and retaliation. It now includes the exchange of raw intelligence on non-conventional threats.[12] Studies on NATO's intelligence sharing, and its progress on fighting terrorism, find that multilateral intelligence sharing within the Alliance is impeded first by the complexity of the "terrorism" concept, and then by the structural constraints existing within the system related to different languages, procedures, databases, training, and capabilities.[13]

For example, after 9/11, the French and German stance on intelligence cooperation was a priority. However, they placed efficiency on human intelligence and fighting "poverty, humiliation and injustices" versus the U.S., which focused on enhancing its technological infrastructure.[14] Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands, in contrast, called for the creation of institutions such as a common European central intelligence agency, while France and Germany suggested that NATO should not spend its energy and resources "recreating methods of action with no real justification."[15]

Research focusing on NATO's intelligence transformation finds that despite intelligence reorganization within NATO's Intelligence Fusion Center, obstacles remain in areas related to handling, releasing, and using timely intelligence.[16] Some argue that "all the high speed won by better

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communication was lost by political and hierarchical obstacles when more commands wanted to be involved in the process. Only SHAPE, and some high staff of NATO are truly joint.''[17] Politicization, the political relationship among countries, the nature of contemporary threats, lack of coordination and rotation of experts, different computer software in NATO and member states, lack of mutual trust, and state tendencies to keep intelligence ''in house,'' augmented by the U.S. monopoly over leadership and technology, impede the flow of intelligence sharing within NATO. Would common understanding over a threat, its intent, current and future prospects help the flow of intelligence sharing within NATO? Stéphane Lefebvre has argued that ''common threat perceptions and shared interests'' are not sufficient for the flow of intelligence sharing as culture, respect for other agencies, and trust also play a significant role in the intelligence sharing arrangement.[18]

Within NATO, the practice of intelligence sharing begins at the national level with the collection of information which is exchanged thereafter within the Alliance's security agencies. Yet, technological fragmentation, decentralization, and the lack of a common culture are among the weaknesses that hamper NATO's intelligence sharing practices. The ''exchange'' or flow of intelligence sharing is influenced by NATO's architectural design and culture which, from a distance, resembles a supranational security, military-based intelligence apparatus that is assessed by some insiders as dominated by U.S. thinking, dysfunctional, and understaffed.[19]

While improvements in the organizational structure have been made and the culture of cooperation has evolved to transform intelligence from the classic Cold War espionage into a military/civilian intelligence analysis, the extent to which the sharing mechanism coherently integrates all members of the Alliance into the system, or whether or not state agencies compete with each other for influence, and on what grounds, remains unclear. The concept of society within the English School (ES) can help scholars and intelligence practitioners understand the complexity of intelligence sharing since ''society'' is able to reveal meanings and values that actors hold within the system, and subsequently show how, why, and when states engage in intelligence sharing, when the solidarist and pluralist ideas of society are applied.

Is intelligence sharing possible within NATO as a regional international society?[20] The question is well-timed since most of what has recently been published on intelligence sharing focuses on intelligence analysis and intelligence organization while neglecting states' sharing practices within the institutional framework. A study, by Miron Varouhakis, using a census sample on two peer reviewed, intelligence publishing journals, revealed that ''theoretical'' studies in intelligence journals account for only 5 percent,

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and the majority of articles published in this group focus on describing ''intelligence,'' ''intelligence analysis,'' and ''organizational analysis.''[21] Obviously, a significant gap exists in the areas related to states' intelligence practices within the intelligence sharing framework. Notably, while NATO has an intelligence infrastructure, it lacks a common threat perception and faces technological knowledge hurdles on the use of technology to enhance intelligence cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY ILLUSTRATED THROUGH NATO'S SHARING FRAMEWORK

According to the definition provided by Hedley Bull, an international society is purposefully created by states that share common norms, values, and cultures and participate in the creation of common rules and institutions. An international society exists:

> [. . .] when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.[22]

The later revised definition advanced by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson suggests that an international society comes into being when:

> [. . .] a group of states . . . which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is necessary factors in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interests in maintaining these arrangements.[23]

In context of the two definitions, NATO constructed its identity—distinct from the Soviet Union and Communism—accepting members into the Alliance based on their willingness to enhance peace and security. Inside NATO, states consented to be bound by a common set of rules in the working of common institutions. A quick glance at the noted definitions may prompt the suggestion that they are similar, but they are not.[24] In the earlier one, the notion of society is based on ''conscious understanding'' of interests and values, while in the latter, society is established by ''dialogue and consent,'' meaning that, when extrapolated to NATO, society can alternate between variants of system and society in which states refrain and/or share intelligence, respectively. Some argue that Bull's initial definition of society exhibits solidarist tendencies in state practices while the Bull–Watson view is pluralist. How, then, does sharing intelligence within NATO constitute a ''society'' or an ''institution of society'' at the regional level?

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The degree of institutional sharing and common understanding distinguishes pluralist and solidarist international societies. The pluralist form reflects mutual recognition of sovereignty and minimalist rules of understanding and institutions. The solidarist version shows evidence of solidarity in conceiving common interests, with the interests of the whole being central. More cooperation is utilized to safeguard peace and security, share intelligence, and sustain common values. Pluralism thus ''emphasizes separateness while solidarism integration.''[25] NATO is a regional society organized on the principles of solidarity for security against potential aggressors. Numerous questions arise. To what extent is solidarity reflected in the framework of intelligence sharing? What counts as security, and what counts as threat? Who decides in NATO what is a threat, and what intelligence or security measures can be used to combat that threat?

In addition to the ''sharing'' concept derived from the definition of international society, the ''conscious'' concept has the potential to show the interplay between pluralism and solidarism at the sub-global level. Some scholars recommend, in assessing whether or not states establish a regional solidarist society, investigating the ''consciousness of common interests and values, which is essential in the formulation of rules and the creation of common institutions.''[26] Others disagree with the approach on grounds that reaching the ''consciousness'' of others is problematic.[27] English School methodologists recommend consideration of how ideas recognized by individuals into a society ultimately affect their consciousness. As Cornelia Navari explained, ''Paying close attention to the language of the actors and to the way they explain and justify their actions [requires a] look into the statements and speeches of political leaders, in interviews to elicit the self-conceptions of what the actors are doing.''[28] In the context of NATO, this means determining whether or not members of the Alliance have a common understanding of ''intelligence'' and the ''intelligence sharing'' process.

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NATO'S INTELLIGENCE SHARING: COMMON MEANINGS

Establishing a ''common meaning'' of what is to be shared, in this case, intelligence, has the potential of enhancing the process of sharing. Scholars focusing on the meaning of intelligence argue, for example, that new democracies experience difficulty in associating a common meaning to the word ''intelligence.''[29] Except in countries that share the English language and a common vision of the world, intelligence often means different things to different people and different countries. In Portugal, intelligence may be related to information; in Romania, knowledge and the mind; and in Bulgaria it has a meaning associated with investigation. For the ''Five Eyes'' alliance (U.S., UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand) for example,

common language, historical experience, and common culture facilitate a better cohesion of the "intelligence meaning," in contrast to the new, but linguistically different, democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, some argue that intelligence sharing among the Five Eyes is not necessarily equally beneficial to all members since the U.S. and the UK spend more resources, and absorb more data, than do Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.[30]

In a context of "shared meaning," the theory of international society extrapolates that, depending upon how NATO members understand the concept of "intelligence" and the process of "intelligence sharing," they will act accordingly in the construction of common institutions to improve the common interest; in this sense: intelligence sharing. Therefore, that the U.S. and the UK are leaders in the field of NATO's intelligence transformation is no surprise. With intelligence as the first line of defense against terrorism, countries increasingly seek to collaborate to develop common meanings in the work of common institutions. In the ES sense, a regional society satisfies the following conditions: "community like aspirations, acknowledgement of interdependence, a minimum degree of shared regional identity, defines and assigns roles to play within the region, physical proximity for interaction, a complementing way to assess each other's efforts toward the same end, and legitimately recognized material aspirations."[31] To what extent NATO illustrates this concept remains open to investigation.

NATO countries are known to use their national intelligence to support their national interests and strategic goals, with intelligence sharing acting a means to achieve those goals through consultation and consensus. In Article 4, NATO allies pledged to "consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened," while in Article 5 they agreed "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Nonconventional threats, however, call for placing emphasis more on consultations since "Article 4 provides an opportunity to share information, promotes a convergence of views, avoids unpleasant surprises, and clears a path for successful action—whether that action is diplomatic, precautionary, remedial, or coercive in nature."[32] Notably, consultation and intelligence sharing are conceptualized at the juncture between technology and terror. NATO seems to have evolved from a pure military defense alliance to an alliance of dialogue and cooperation, which subscribes to the second definition of international society. An established argument in the English School suggests that an international society emerges in line with the logic of culture (the civilizational model) or according to the logic of anarchy (the functional model). Empirically, international society evolved through movement to a common culture, values, and interests; or, in a more limited way, unity through a shared

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language, common literacy, and artistic tradition. NATO evolved, in this sense, in line with both culture and anarchy to include friends and enemies in unity based on common interests in achieving peace and waging a common fight against contemporary threats. Do, in fact all NATO members have a common understanding of the common threat or a common approach to deal with it? Historically, the Christian International Society, for example, shared a moral culture or a set of common values reinforcing its units' common interests, as did the European international society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries whose elements shared a diplomatic, international political culture. Some scholars argue that the logic of culture has determined the degree of states' integration into international society, but the logic of anarchy more than likely brought states into international society.[33]

For example, the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952 in NATO was facilitated by the ongoing Korean War in Asia while NATO's integration of Eastern and Central Europe was influenced by the desire for protection after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Through enlargement, the Alliance evolved into a Euro–Atlantic instrument to deliver peace and security not only to the North Atlantic, but also to the Eastern and Central European sector. How then has intelligence sharing reflected this new unity? Does a distinction exist between old and new friends, friends and enemies, core and periphery? Two distinctive features of international society are unity and coherence when in relation to power, common interests, and values. Consensus describes the agreed framework of rules and institutions subscribed to by NATO members, while coherence reflects the degree of shared values or the shared framework of a common understanding. Leading ES scholars nevertheless argue that NATO's limited rules of coexistence are an indicator of a society in decline.

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NATO Intelligence Sharing Practices—Evidence of Solidarism and Pluralism

Academics and policymakers refer to the 21st century as the ''Pacific Century,'' with U.S. strategic interests having shifted from Europe to China, North Korea, and Japan. Budget cuts in the U.S. military and capability gaps in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets of the European Allies prompted then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to declare in 2011 that ''Europe may no longer be worth defending'' because it is unwilling to pay for its own defense. According to Gates, ''At times, NATO has struggled to sustain a deployment of 25,000 to 40,000 troops, not just in boots on the ground, but in crucial support assets, such as helicopters, transport aircraft maintenance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.''[34] In his view, the transatlantic gap in defense spending

and the lack of political will of government officials will seriously hamper NATO's military missions.

Considering how members of the Alliance approached the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, consensus over how to conceptualize the vital common interest and provide for security is seemingly difficult to reach. For example, in Afghanistan, Germany restricted its troops from using lethal force, thereby preventing their deployment in combat against the Taliban. A change of government in the Netherlands resulted in a sudden withdrawal of its troops. A new government in Romania raised concerns over budget, deaths, and serious injuries of Romanian soldiers, prompting discussions of a withdrawal of its 890 troops from Iraq.[35] Similar discussions extended to Lithuania, Italy, and other NATO members. Gates publicly stated that NATO's lack of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets made the most advanced European fighter jets useless. NATO officials responded to Gates's concerns about the ''smart defense'' approach by making aerial refueling a strategic priority, and applying the principle of pooling and sharing of military resources on capabilities and procurement. Up to this point, NATO members had relied on U.S. leadership and technological assets to coordinate offensives.[36] In the defense industry, Gates was known to advocate ''strategy over procurement,''[37] and it is relevant to consider here the compatibility of technology when addressing current threats, as well as the ability of current technology to win the peace (including hearts and minds of the public) in countering existing threats. The purpose of intelligence is to assist decisionmakers in areas where immediate action is needed.[38] A study released in 2006 found that ''NATO Headquarters had a limited mandate or capabilities for intelligence gathering except when there are deployments of NATO or NATO-led forces. For intelligence, NATO depended on nations, which then shared it as appropriate with PfP partners, and other countries contributing forces to NATO-led operations in PfP activities.''[39] Intelligence is ''the world of secrets'' which a nation can share or strategically keep from friends in attempts to construct its identity or consolidate its position within the Alliance.

Some argue that the future of information belongs, not to the greatest collectors of information, but to those who share the information effectively with their partners.[40] Most of the concerns regarding intelligence sharing expressed by policymakers reveal that intelligence sharing is not open, transparent, or frequent. Mistrust, lack of common infrastructure, and technology are among the key barriers to greater efficiency in intelligence sharing. Though a necessary security capability in the 21st century networked world, the shift from ''need to know'' to ''need to share'' has not been smooth. Even in the U.S., sharing has occurred in intermittent stages that involve information provided with a lack of

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context, information decentralization, and distribution and flexibility across agency lines that inhibit attempts to understand the meaning of information. Henceforth, U.S. practitioners argue that the creation of a bigger picture is now possible, as the virtual reorganization of information sharing and automatic alerts to "enable data to find data."[41]

Agreeing over a common definition of terrorism and having a common approach to combat it will enhance intelligence cooperation within NATO. Whereas the U.S. and UK deal with terrorism in the military realm, allies belonging to the EU address terrorism in the domain of crime and law enforcement. They look at peace and security through a human security, democracy, and constructive conflict management perspective. In essence, Islamic terrorism, arms proliferation, criminal organizations, economic and scientific interests are unquestionably central on the intelligence agendas of NATO's allies.

However, when it comes to cyber security for example, Belgian intelligence cooperates with the EU and NATO security bodies when they are targeted by cyber-attacks. But cyber-attacks are then discussed in the context of criminal behavior not terrorist behavior, and thus are not a military concern to Brussels.[42] Belgium's intelligence chief seemed to suggest that a UK cyber-defense institution may not be sufficient to defend, for example, NATO's periphery, despite the fact that "at the level of international cooperation, exchange of information is very active." He credited this to the absence of a centralized body where civilian, military, and the federal police work in tandem to come up with a general definition and a common approach on dealing with cyber threats.

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Intelligence Sharing and NATO's Old Allies: The Case of Turkey and the United States

In context of "common threat" and "intelligence sharing," Turkey is relevant to consider, especially in regard to Iran's nuclear threat. Unlike the U.S., Turkey still refuses to acknowledge Tehran as a regional threat for destabilization and an arms race, and instead includes Israel as a country posing a major threat. The U.S. continues to view Turkey as a strategic ally, suitable for placing a missile defense system to counter the proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially those coming from Iran. Turkey interprets the proposed missile system as an instrument that could destabilize the region and fuel the arms race. For instance, in the midst of missile system negotiation, Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu emphasized that "We don't see any threat from any of our neighboring countries, whether it is Iran, Russia, Syria or others [...] I stated very clearly that Turkey will not be a frontal or flanking country [of the NATO missile shield] and we do not want to see again a zone of the Cold War and its psychology in our region."[43]

An emerging pattern in the complexity of intelligence sharing is the search for agreement on a common definition of threat. While discussions between Ankara and Washington continued over the installation of two radar systems, Turkey was not sure whether this project was a matter of providing for security or a way to increase dissension in the region. "This is not an issue for NATO now. First, a definition of the threat against NATO members must be made. Then we can consider the issue in this light."[44] Notably, both allies exhibit interesting practices of intelligence sharing regarding their common enemy, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Without a zero sum mentality, its interaction with the U.S. enabled Turkey to deal with PKK through military means.

Nevertheless, existing evidence shows that the U.S. decided to share intelligence with Turkey on the PKK only when that group interfered with American interests in Iraq, and only when Washington wanted to prevent a unilateral invasion by Turkey of northern Iraq on grounds of Turkish self-defense. Empirical evidence shows that sharing intelligence intensified between the U.S. and Turkey in November 2007, under the George W. Bush administration, when both countries declared the PKK a terrorist organization and a common enemy.[45] The intelligence sharing process consisted of allowing the Turkish military personnel to use the Predator system and air vehicles with sensors in missions of reconnaissance. "The US military began supplying real-time intelligence to Turkey and Turkish Armed Forces which used the intelligence to launch air strikes against PKK targets in the north of Iraq."[46] Concerns over sharing timely intelligence with Iran facing a terrorist threat from PJAK (the Iranian branch of the PKK) frequently brought the U.S.–Turkey cooperation on intelligence under scrutiny over the issue of trust.[47] But Turkey claimed that its intelligence sharing with Iran is only political and did not reach the military high levels.[48] The U.S. believed otherwise; amassing suspicions that the Turkey–Iran sharing was strategic and operational.

Intelligence sharing between Turkey and the U.S. nevertheless continued, to the extent that the U.S. showed leadership and trained Turkish pilots on how to use real-time intelligence to avoid friendly fire over northern Iraq.[49] The efficiency of the intelligence cooperation came under scrutiny when a Turkish military post was attacked by 300 PKK terrorists resulting in 17 casualties. Though this was a NATO intelligence failure, it was also a failure of the effectiveness of "actionable" intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Turkey. When asked to explain how 300 PKK terrorists were able to cross the border between Iraq and Turkey to attack the post without being caught by U.S. surveillance instruments, a U.S. official diverted the response.[50] To overcome the failure, the U.S. suggested that Turkey increase communication between two offices allowing the U.S. to adjust the Turkish intelligence system. Friendly relations in intelligence

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sharing expanded when Turkey requested that the U.S. base Predator systems in Turkey.[51] Intelligence sharing with respect to PKK movements, slowed down and stopped after the initial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. The supply of intelligence 24 hours a day in Cyrillic on PKK movements has stopped because of threats to the safety of U.S. pilots flying over the PKK-inhabited region.[52] This is a clear indication that the practice of sharing intelligence within the framework of NATO goes hand in hand with technological power and states individual interests.

Within NATO, Turkey ardently advocates not sharing intelligence with non-NATO countries including Greek Cyprus.[53] In the context of NATO's ballistic missile defense system, Turkey sought numerous assurances from the U.S. and its NATO allies that intelligence gathered using the missile shield's sensors would not be shared with Israel.[54] On 26 September 2013 Turkey surprised Israel, NATO, and the U.S. by announcing its intention to buy a long-range missile defense system from China, not only because of its low price, but because of Chinese willingness to engage in co-production and technology transfer with Turkey.[55] Turkey's relationship with Israel goes beyond constraints of NATO membership to include such bilateral incidents as Israel's interception of a Turkish ship with what Turkey claimed to be the "Israeli military using force against civilians including women and children, and the elderly who wished to take humanitarian aid to Gaza people."[56] Previously, Turkey and Israel had maintained a strong strategic bilateral relationship enhanced by arms procurement. Ankara addressed its gap in surveillance satellites by buying from Israel 10 Heron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[57] Yet, intelligence sharing between the two countries did not extend much beyond that of spy satellites provided by Israel to boost the Turkish military's capability to fight the PKK.[58] Some Turkey officials have argued that a sincere Israeli apology on killing Turkish civilians could mend their relationship. But in the interim, Turkey has used the issue to block, whenever presented with the opportunity, Israel's access to NATO's Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) in the Chicago Summit and other critical missions. Notably, as a NATO official stated, "NATO's Israel relations cannot be restored until Turkey–Israel relations are normalized."[59] The Turkey–Israel quarrel reflects external geopolitical power and bilateral interests brought within the Alliance's intelligence sharing forum by its members.

The U.S.–Turkey relationship highlights the importance of real-time intelligence, the fragmentation of intelligence when it involves individual state interests, the relevance of cost and innovation, and the different conceptualizations of terrorism and terror. Unlike the U.S., Turkey has been accustomed to living with ethnic terror for quite some time. In the context of intelligence, sharing is nothing more than the vital flow and timing of information toward a source that may use it. Unused intelligence

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has no value. Improving the flow of intelligence is a critical task for NATO, a voluntary organization of sovereign states that have difficulty volunteering their national intelligence within the Alliance, due first to technological incompatibility and thereafter from considerations related to the importance of the intelligence, as well as the member countries historical and cultural differences. NATO claims to have a long history of good intelligence-sharing practices, and hopes that, through an array of measures, to come to a better understanding of the nature of the terrorist threat on the basis that "prevention is more than information sharing."[60] In the area of prevention, the Alliance invests in technologies and scientific solutions to prevent the spectacular actions of suicide bombers in public spaces. One program of cooperation is STANDEX with Russia, non-NATO member. Good practices refers to the support provided to allies when hosting high visibility events such as the Athens Olympic Games, the 2006 FIFA World Cup, and meetings of heads of state and governments. As NATO's Assistant Secretary General, Ambassador Gabor Iklody explained in 2011,

> NATO provides a forum for transatlantic political dialogue and consultations on counter-terrorism for its 28 Allies and increasingly for its partner nations. Today, the Alliance has more than 50 partner nations from around the world. With our partners, we consult and share information, assist with capacity building and joint capability development in areas such as counter-IED or harbor protection. All in all, NATO offers more than 1,600 activities under its partnership programs, including training courses, exercises and seminars in the fight against terrorism.[61]

Member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) endorsed a plan to fight terrorism through efforts of information sharing and views related to terrorism, both in EAPC meetings and in seminars and workshops under the auspices of EAPC/PfP.[62] Notably, the plan specifies that lead nations take an initiative to organize meetings. EAPC states maintain an EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU) to promote, in accordance with their domestic laws, an exchange of intelligence relevant to terrorist threats. But the mechanism of intelligence sharing within NATO is in flux, as are the threats. The establishment of the NATO Centre of Excellence and Defense against Terrorism units helps NATO enhance dialogue and scientific cooperation in identifying and mitigating new threats to security.

An occasional obstacle to information sharing is incompatible technology that can affect part of the infrastructure of intelligence sharing. Compatibility in computer technology and better coordination helped the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counter the IED threat in Afghanistan. "Especially in land operations . . . we have been a coalition

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that has been divided by our technology . . . we now stand together as a coalition, joined in our technology'' said Georges D'hollander, general manager of NATO's C3 research and development establishment in The Hague.[63] Access to information is granted on various levels, depending upon its sensitivity and the will of the country to share. The ''smart defense'' concept calls for further cooperation and coordination among NATO countries. Nine NATO countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Britain, and the United States) agreed to share imagery and other information from national assets. ''By rapidly sharing imagery, we can avoid having multiple assets deployed in the same location, cover a significantly larger area, or cover a specific area for a longer period. In effect, what we get is more intelligence for our euro.''[64] Notably, political will is another obstacle to information sharing.

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THE FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING PRACTICES WITH FRIENDS AND FORMER ENEMIES

A current issue is intelligence sharing between older NATO members and the new entrants. NATO-led military operations require an integrated intelligence sharing structure, and although the infrastructure has been created, NATO members remain reticent in sharing national intelligence within the NATO network. Mutual trust in sharing raw intelligence is influenced by political preferences, special relationships, state concerns over misuse of their intelligence, the possibility of being wrong, either by faulty satellite systems or untruthful informers, or merely state preference for holding onto information in order to test friendships and the reliability of their partners.[65] On intelligence cooperation, U.S. General Wesley Clark, a former NATO Supreme Commander, emphasized that ''one has to be very careful of information that is given by any other country's sources. It is a function of the precision of the information, the source of the information, the duration of the relationship, and other conflicting methods. It is part of using intelligence to be able to evaluate its credibility.''[66] Furthermore, some have suggested that NATO would benefit from having a ''black box'' to collect and disseminate intelligence without states knowing who provided the intelligence since, when it comes to intelligence sharing, ''We always get into this argument about what we can release to our friends.''[67] While NATO members agree that they must meet the common threats wherever they are, they seem to disagree over how to approach them. In the American realm, the war on terror was framed as ''an intelligence problem, a financial problem, a battle of ideas, a problem dealing with ungoverned areas, and a problem of countries providing haven.''[68] In contrast, Europeans view the radical movements as the result of injustices committed by colonization and underdevelopment, a

problem to be dealt with in the justice system, thus outside NATO's competency and brief. Germany's former Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, for instance, asserted that ''terrorism cannot be fought with arms and police. We must also combat its roots in economic underdevelopment.''[69]

Intelligence sharing between Poland and the U.S., for example, unfolds in the framework of strategic cooperation and bilateral agreements. Both states agree to share information on terrorism and nuclear proliferation within the framework of NATO's Article 3, which emphasizes ''separately and jointly.'' While the U.S. engages in providing ''missile defense, situational awareness and information regarding threat assessments associated with US military facilities, assets and personnel present on the territory of Poland,'' the U.S. appears to lead in intelligence sharing, intending to provide Poland with an avenue process ''to request information from the US that pertains to intelligence or warning threat information associated with US military facilities on the territory of Poland.''[70] This indicates that the information sharing between these two countries flows in a process controlled by the U.S. and when the interests of the U.S. are affected. Notably, there is indication that states resort to assuring faster intelligence sharing after they sign contractual agreements (i.e., Belgium and Turkey involving the PKK).[71]

France's intelligence sharing with the U.S. intensified after 9/11 and, as a French official stated, ''We do it quietly. We had to work on our intelligence very hard during the 1990s, when there was a wave of terrorist attacks on French targets from Algerian Islamists. We have the linguists and we have the expertise. And the US knows that.''[72] Both France and Germany were urged by the U.S. to play a bigger role and commit more forces in Afghanistan. Intelligence sharing within NATO is seemingly coordinated by the U.S. and facilitated by the American technological infrastructure. France's role in NATO increased after its dispute with Washington over the U.S. invasion in Iraq when Paris agreed to participate in peacekeeping operations training Iraqi police personnel. France had pulled its troops out of the NATO command in 1966 but remained a NATO member. After 2003, military and intelligence sharing between France and the U.S. intensified. France has been active in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan where a French general commanded NATO forces. ''We are the second largest contributor in military terms to NATO and the fifth largest in terms of financial support,'' according to Michelle Alliot-Marie, French Defense Minister.[73] The U.S. sharing of intelligence with France intensified with France's 2013 intervention in Mali.

ASSESSING NATO'S SOLIDARIST AND PLURALIST PRACTICES

Although NATO has an intelligence sharing infrastructure, it lacks a common threat perception and faces technological hurdles on how to use

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technology to enhance intelligence cooperation. Within NATO, the allies acknowledge the norm of ''need to share'' intelligence, technology, and methods of surveillance in countering contemporary threats. They share the importance of intelligence coordination, and the need to assess threats and consider common responses. Membership and access to intelligence are norms guiding the sharing process. Considering their experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO members display concern for better unity, coherence, respect, and international law enforcement. Security is valued, but threats to mutual security are not viewed with the same intensity by all members of the alliance. Although NATO's intelligence is shared bilaterally and multilaterally national interests still govern states' behaviors. When sharing intelligence a fear of compromise and penetration prevails. Threats are conceptualized globally and regionally. But no common intelligence sharing picture exists of which threats are global or regional. For example, the PKK came to be considered a ''common threat'' by Turkey and the U.S. in 2007, thereby making it a global threat. But the PJAK, the PKK's Iranian branch, had not been viewed in the same light before concerns over Turkey sharing intelligence with Iran on the PJAK arose within the U.S.

The allies embrace the idea that NATO is a forum of engagement and dialogue. They acknowledge U.S. leadership, expertise, and technological capability. But fears related to a lack of technology exist when acting on intelligence and sharing intelligence using compatible systems, as well as concerns that too much technology, such as the missile defense system, will produce more threats, insecurity, and arms races rather than security. The allies also share the idea that NATO is united in its mission. The union is influenced by the United Nations (UN) mandate to interfere in other sovereignties (i.e., Iraq and the division between new and older democracies). States evidently value sharing capabilities and assets in a common defense system. But when volunteering their national intelligence, the lack of common definitions of threats impedes the flow and quality of information. Allies do not have a common understanding of threats and the ability of technology to monitor and counter the emerging threats. As the case of Turkey shows, a lack of technological capabilities to share intelligence prevails in what is supposed to be a critical focus to NATO, the Middle East. Some suggest the need to identify a problem before it becomes a problem. Obviously, Turkey demonstrated Alliance solidarity when it agreed to host a missile defense system on its territory. With respect to solidarist and pluralist societies, NATO is a solidarist society emphasizing the core mission of the alliance. Intelligence sharing is however, compartmentalized, regionalized, and influenced by common identity, culture, and values. Threats are also regionalized, and, when the U.S. is involved, they become global and are dealt with technologically and militarily.

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A lack of unity persists, however, at the periphery on how NATO's response to threats should be accomplished. The core formed by older Allies is fragmented over access to intelligence and the existence of the UN mandate on whether or not to interfere in other sovereignties. The lasting mistrust between France and the U.S., and the disunity among Germany, France, the UK, and the U.S. over the war in Iraq, as well as how to use German forces, continues to impact NATO's relationships. The claim that ''pluralism emphasizes separateness'' is evident in how NATO members approach such common interests as the PKK and terrorism (in military vs. police realms), intelligence-sharing mechanisms (the need of a common compatible infrastructure) integrating both civilian and military capabilities, and their reactions over sharing intelligence. Unity is apparent over ''the need to have and the need to integrate.'' However, disunity is visible in the process of ''what'' and ''when'' to integrate. The interplay between the regional and global scale in intelligence sharing is manifest in the context of membership, access to technology, friendship, and enmity relationships.

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ENHANCING GLOBAL SECURITY

NATO has an intelligence sharing infrastructure, and elements of a solidarist society exist in the urgency or need to have and share intelligence, acquiring technology, the importance of intelligence coordination, sharing capabilities and assets, as well as combating the common threats. Most states find themselves wondering at the ''need to know'' intelligence level rather than progressing toward the ''need to share'' intelligence level. Within NATO, intelligence sharing is more than a governing principle, it is a process, a supranational institution in which good practices do not seem visible when things go well. Bad practices, however, disclose the shortcomings of the process. Intelligence sharing is regionalized and fragmented by special interests. In the case of the U.S. and Turkey, the failure of intelligence sharing may be attributed to the idea of a common threat, time, technology, political will, and states' national interests. In their intelligence cooperation, both Turkey and the U.S. went beyond the Alliance's core mission to provide for their own interests. In part, the U.S. does not want to share intelligence with Turkey because Turkey, in return, may share it with Iran. Consequently, Turkey does not want NATO to share intelligence with Israel, which, in return, may share that intelligence with Greek Cyprus.

NATO has a basic form of intelligence sharing infrastructure but it needs a common understanding of threats, intelligence, and the sharing process. Given its size and strength, the U.S. has the responsibility to lead, train, reorganize, and coordinate intelligence sharing within NATO. Ultimately,

the development of a common definition of threats will help NATO identify common approaches to the use of innovative technology to address these threats. America's role in NATO is paramount. While the U.S. can lead the process, other countries can learn how to help lead, train their forces, and coordinate relations to improve the system. A common intelligence sharing infrastructure is critical, as is the political will to use it. The sharing of intelligence is possible within NATO when allies have a sense of enlightened trust, have established a common understanding of the threat environment, and act on that understanding to create common sharing institutions, while avoiding duplication and special interests. Intelligence sharing needs a technologized infrastructure invulnerable to cyber-attacks. But, as one NATO official has suggested, national and international ''threat prevention'' is more than intelligence sharing in matters of common global security.

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